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The Strike Through Future of the Screen

In this paper I propose to consider contemporary screen culture through the works of Paul Virilio and Bernard Stiegler in order to show how the screen might be considered a negative abyss. Here, I suggest that the essential property of the screen – absolute surface – closes the viewer off in a solipsistic space and creates the effect of infinite depth, which empties them of all content. In the process I suggest the screen transforms the viewer into a tech-no-body possessed by a fragmented, fractured, self I explore through reference to R. D. Laing’s (2010) work on schizophrenia. In order to begin my paper I refer to what we might consider the original theory of the screen – Plato’s myth of the cave from the Republic (2012), recently translated into a story of Hollywood deception by Alain Badiou. Here, I think we encounter the original paradox of the screen, where absolute surface evokes the effect of endless depth, which I track through Nietzsche’s (1974a, 1974b) story of the cave and notion of the abyss that looks deep into the soul of the person who stares into it for too long. On the basis of this work, I take up the problem of the horizon, which takes in Husserl (2012), who saw the horizon as that which we must work towards in order to progress through time, and Virilio (2006b), who develops the idea of the negative horizon where speed collapses distance towards an absolutely dense moment that envelops the viewer and reduces their ability to think through the future. On the horizon where there is no distance, the screen, the negative abyss, comes back into focus: the screen is the surface which is absolutely self-identical, absolutely without depth, but at the same time creates the image of endless depth and the bottomless abyss.

Fast forward into the 21st century, I locate my vision of the screen in Virilio’s (2000) theory of deserts and virtualisation, where the translation of material objects into images destroys the phenomenological depth of the thing and does violence to bodies which are obliterated in a phobia of corporeality. On screen there are no bodies, only more of the phantoms which populated Plato’s original cave. While Virilio (2000, 2006b) opposes the dystopia of the screen because of its revulsion towards the thickness of the thing itself, Stiegler (2010) examines the ways in which screen culture destroys the mind of the viewer through violent attention capture and the destruction of the duration of desire in the black hole of drive. In this way a discussion of Stiegler’s work on technics shows that the tech-no-body is also a destroyed mind which collapses into psychosis because there is no authority to organise its subjectivity beyond that of the market which commands it to enjoy itself now, without further delay. Unpacking Stiegler’s (2010) psychoanalysis through reference to Laing’s (2010) work on the destroyed self, I move on to show how screen culture traps the self in a solipsistic prison through its reflective surface which captures attention through illumination and fascination. The psychological effect of this solipsistic bind is to transform the world of others into a horror movie, which causes the self to split, fragment, and disappear into its own interior, what Bruno Bettelheim (1972) calls the lonely fortress, where the only life line to the world is the screen. In conclusion I suggest that we might find this condition of the tech-no-body possessed by a destroyed self everywhere in contemporary screen culture. From the Japanese Hikikomori who can no longer relate to other people to the porn addict who can only find sexual release through images on screen, my thesis is that we can read Virilio (2005, 2006b, 2008a) and Stiegler (2010, 2011b) to find that the squared horizon is also a negative abyss – a bottomless surface, a luminous nightmare, perhaps the technological dystopia of the 21st century to come.

Both Virilio and Stiegler paint a dystopian vision of screen culture across various works. Through a discussion of logics of disappearance (Virilio, 2009) and disorientation (Stiegler, 2009) they represent the screen as the vanishing point of western technological development, which is also the destruction of the human. Here, the human is similarly defined in terms of distance and the horizon, where horizon refers to both geographical distance and the reach of consciousness that conditions our potential to think and plan for the future. What Virilio calls the ‘squared horizon’ in Desert Screen (2005) and Open Sky (2008a) is thus a kind of thoughtless dystopia organised around the collapse of the endurance of distance and depth into absolute proximity and surface. Where there is no space, there is also no time, but only immediacy, or what he calls real time. In Stiegler’s work, and particularly his Technics and Time (1998, 2009, 2011b) trilogy, this process of expansion and contraction is explained through reference to the collapse of the local, where culture is made, into the global, where dis-orientation destroys the subject through the annihilation of the symbolic ground that forms its necessary base. Here, the psychoanalytic horizon of desire, where the subject must wait for what they want, collapses into drive, where they must have everything now. Thus there is a sense in which Virilio’s squared horizon coincides with a thanatological mode of subjectivity, where the subject wants everything, but cannot wait for anything. In this death drive mode of identity, the failing subject must have my heart’s desires now. Remember, following Freud’s conceptualisation of the death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (2003), the thanatological subject seeks to escape the pain of existence through death, which is the closest he can come to life before birth once he has emerged into the world. While this short-circuit to the satisfaction of life in death is usually barred and prohibited by Oedipal regulation which says ‘No!, you must wait’ – this is, in Lacan’s reformulation of Freud, the structure of desire – Stiegler’s (2011a, 2012, 2014b) central question explored across his later works on decadence, disaffection, and the uncontrollable society concerns what happens when this process of duration cancels in the immediacy of drive. His conclusion is that when the subject gets what he wants now, the objects of his desire become worthless, and he becomes an addictogenic subject. Building upon the Neo-Marxism of Adorno and Horkheimer (1997), he shows how the subject must consume faster and faster, seeking out satisfaction in objects that never find their mark, until there is no more. In the end, there is nowhere else to go, but death, the final moment where life collapses towards the flat line of complete satisfaction and eternal peace.

In a sense screen culture is both a cause and symptom of this existential condition because of the ways it collapses distance and duration into proximity and immediacy and offers the endless promise of escape – the dark abyss of freedom. However, the problem with this potential freedom is, of course, that it is always-already vanishing. Despite the appearance of distance, the screen is flat, a surface, which has no depth. Thus the negative abyss offers no real freedom, and does not lead anywhere new, but rather trans-fixes the viewer somewhere and nowhere, in such a way that the darkness of the screen becomes a representation of the nothingness of death. In this sense the screen addict is the contemporary dystopian subject par excellence. Consider the sex addict who consumes hardcore porn day and night. He browses infinite sexual variety, but under pressure of sheer quantity the endlessness of choice collapses into indifference, and eroticism becomes a crushingly banal shopping list. In the same way the ‘shut in’ – the Japanese Hikikomori – spends his life locked in his room. He travels everywhere through the screen, but ultimately goes nowhere. These characters, who potentially represent the future of psychopathology, are reflections of Virilio’s (2000, 2008a, 2009) cybernetic man and Stiegler’s dis-individual (2010, 2011a, 2012), who similarly lose their identity before a form of technological extension that paradoxically envelops them, leading to a state of techno-cultural claustrophobia. Thus the screen opens everything up to them, but at the same time locks them into permanent immobility, isolation, and autism, which is, of course, a psychopathology of communication (Bettelheim, 1972). Under these conditions the contemporary post-Kantian apocalyptic fantasy of the ‘world without us’, where we seek to imagine the Earth following the extinction of the human, becomes an effect of techno-claustrophobia, or the ‘I without world’, where the screen addict loses all contact with the world and falls into paranoid fantasy. Here, the idea of the ‘world without us’ is a reflection of the screen addict’s autism and alienation from the world of others represented by the abyss of the screen, which suggests endless possibility, but always-already closes back to the infinite regress of solipsistic self-reflection. 

The idea of the abyss itself has a long history in philosophy which essentially revolves around mysticism, idealism, and existentialism. Looking back to medieval thought, we might consider the dark mysticism of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (1993), before taking in the modern post-Kantianism of Schelling (2000) and Schopenhauer (1966a,b), until finally reaching Nietzsche (1974b), where the abyss represents the terror of existential freedom. In Nietzsche’s work the abyss ironically represents transcendence, and the possibility that we might become more tomorrow than we are today. However, he also holds out the possibility and the danger of the abyss that gazes back into the soul of the viewer. That is to say that he imagines that the terror of freedom can over-take the existential subject, preventing her from moving or doing anything with the possibility thrust upon her by the death of God. Caught up in this state, what he calls negative nihilism, the inky blackness of the abyss is no longer distance, but rather a flat surface which seems to have no dimensions, and wraps around the anxious subject, suffocating, leaving her unable to breathe. It is this abyssal surface that I think Virilio (2005, 2008a) captures through his idea of the flat, squared, horizon that we find everywhere today. While Virilio (2005) wrote about the squared horizon primarily in terms of the American military’s virtualisation of space in the Gulf, today the squared horizon, or negative abyss, is everywhere. If Ted Turner, and CNN, destroyed the horizon of space and time in the 1980s, then I would suggest that Steve Jobs, and Apple, have confronted the contemporary post-modern subject with the negative abyss through the invention of the iPad, the total screen: the screen which is no longer in the living room, the space of the family, but rather possesses the techno-self in privacy. Under these conditions the individual or dis-individual is absolutely exposed to the abyss of the screen outside of embodied social mediation, which is blanked out or transformed into background noise or interference. 

But before we return to the manifestation of the negative abyss in contemporary life, I would like to return to Ancient Greece and think about the first screen in Plato’s (2012) cave. Perhaps we can find the origins of contemporary screen culture in Ancient Greece, and Plato’s story of the cave from the Republic (2012), which Badiou translates into a kind of Hollywood teen movie in his hyper-Republic. The story explains the situation of a group of people trapped underground in a cave. They are chained, fascinated by images projected onto a wall (the original screen), and have no sense of the world beyond. Eventually one of the prisoners miraculously wakes up, escapes, and reaches the surface. He emerges into reality and observes the sun which shines light upon the world. Plato’s text is a metaphor for the escape from opinion and dogma into real knowledge and truth and formed the basis of his theory of education through dialectics. Here, truth is a trajectory, a line of flight, which we must follow in order to learn about the world. However, Plato was alive to the paradox of this situation. Is it possible to lead the fascinated out of the cave or must the slack jawed viewers work their own way to the surface? While Marxists tended to imagination that the education of the masses was possible through ideology critique and so on, those who were faithful to Plato’s Socratic roots saw that every individual must find their own path to enlightenment. Enter Nietzsche who thought that the Godless world of modernity threw humanity into a new state of existential possibility represented by the abyss. The idea of the dark cave made a comeback, of course, in his story of Zarathustra (1991), who emerges from his cave to tell the town’s folk that ‘God is Dead’. Nietzsche’s idea is that the prophet, who is also a madman, will dispel the illusion or image of religion, and open up the horizon of freedom and becoming – the abyss of the future. But Nietzsche’s fear was that the abyss of freedom would be over-taken by modernity and techno-science. This is more or less what happened in the 20th century. Heidegger (1977) would later explain in his work on technology how techno-science – what Stiegler calls technics – frames life. The world has become a picture, a world picture, through a process of instrumental enframing, which media theorists, such as Virilio, would later understand in terms of screens. 









The Loneliness of Screen Culture

In Virilio’s (2000) work the permanently present future leaves us marooned in a global desert. He explains that speed needs deserts and creates them in order to enable maximum velocity. In the desert every object is a barrier to speed and must be slimmed down to the weight of the sign where it becomes a utopian symbol of the future that never comes. Consider Apple and the fantasy of the creative user. Under conditions of obligatory creativity, you will have ideas. In this universe the object should, therefore, do no more than is required to enable travel and movement – the functional or hyper-functional object has no other role than to travel, to move, to communicate. In this respect, the iPad takes me there – it takes me everywhere – but at same time leaves me nowhere, trans-fixed before the flat surface of the screen. The screen is, therefore, a kind of negative version of the portable hole carried by Looney Tunes’ characters, such as Wile E. Coyote, who use this Acme invention to enable inter-dimensional transportation. While Looney Tunes’ portable hole is flat, but becomes an abyss when placed on a wall or floor, the screen creates the effect of the abyss, but has no real depth. It is the pure illusion of depth. I want to argue that this idea of the disappearance of depth is central to Virilio’s (2000, 2008a, 2009) thought and key to his politics which I take to be concerned with the impact of technological disappearance upon the human which is destroyed by processes of techno-endo-colonization. In his work the very best case scenario is that the human will be transformed into a kind of cybernetic phantom, a disembodied avatar that inhabits a blindingly bright world of shadows. In the worst case scenario, those who are unable to make the leap to techno-culture will become victims of the logic of disappearance and the technological phobia of thickness. In this situation the new techno lumpenproletariat will vanish and effectively cease to exist. This is the case because paradoxically they remain grounded, and unable to escape into the techno un-ground, or virtuality, which is real in post-modern screen culture. 

However, Virilio (2006c) is clear - this tendency towards virtualisation and disappearance has a long history in Europe. He argues that this drive to reach escape velocity – and break free of the gravity of the human – has been played out across modern history. We might risk reading this need for speed back even further. Consider Plato’s (2002) Apology, where the founder of European philosophy, Socrates, embraces death in order to escape from his body and become an idea. In the Jacques Louis David’s work of 1787, The Death of Socrates, escape velocity is represented in Socrates up-turned finger - I am sky! Of course, David was also the ‘official’ painter of the French Revolution, who captured the spirit of Virilio’s (2006c) revolutionary dromomaniacs who desperately wanted to move forward into the future. Akin to Socrates, the French Revolutionaries wanted to touch the sky and escape from their earth bound, ethnic, context towards the universal sphere, which would eventually find representation in the Russian modernism of Malevich and his famous Black Square. Long before Jobs’ negative abyss remade contemporary culture in the image of H. P. Lovecraft, who was also fascinated by mirrors and reflective surfaces, Malevich’s Black Square sought to represent the abyss of the modern future through the flat surface. In many respects his modern focus on the supremacy of geometry to the ethnic, grounded, and rooted symbolised what was to come. 

For Virilio (2008a), the drive to escape the gravity of the earth began to edge towards its limit in the post-modern age of mass media, computerisation, and the turn to the sign. Seen through what he calls the ‘cathode ray window’ (2005), the world becomes a virtual place, or space, a desert, or, what he calls in his book of the same name, a lost dimension (1991). Slumped in front of the screen, the body, the original vehicle, becomes a cybernetic machine, an avatar, and the tech-no-body is born. In a sense I think that what we find here is Virilio’s take on Foucauldian bio-politics - a kind of techno-bio-politics concerned with the destruction of the human through the techno-colonization of the animal body. However, this is not the end of the story, because we also need to think about how the negative abyss impacts upon the mind of the cybernaut through a discussion of what we might call, extending Stiegler, techno-psycho-politics. In Stiegler’s work, and particularly the Technics and Time (1998, 2009, 2011b) series, technology becomes about making up for human lack. Against Promethean readings of technology, which are about making humans more like Gods, in Stiegler’s Epimethean vision of history, technology becomes a crutch to enable humans to survive in a world where they are at a competitive disadvantage to animals with claws, wings, and sharp teeth. Akin to Virilio, Stiegler (2009) takes up the idea of technological extension, expansion, and speed and argues that eventually modernity leads to globalisation that results in the disorientation of human life. Thus we are torn out of our embedded contexts and thrown into a world without a sense of order or structure. Order and structure suffer under high speed technics because elaborate symbolisation and culture itself are reduced to basic data ready for equation and calculation – the objective here is to simply enable light speed communication. 

As a result Stiegler (2014a) talks about symbolic misery and explains how the disappearance of culture in speed renders people dumb before the screen. While true identity, what he calls trans-individuality, relies on circuits of sociability, Stiegler’s concept of high speed symbolic misery shows how the social self is destroyed and transformed into a lonely dis-individual who is neither with others or, as a result of this asociability, secure in itself. Living in anomie, and without any kind of social structure to order cultural identity, the dis-individual loses the ability to think outside of the culture industries. In much the same way that the screen, the negative abyss, precludes entry into the future, Stiegler (2009) shows how light speed communication, a blizzard of signs, and symbolic misery, prevent the lonely dis-individual from being able to construct a narrative in order to plot their movement from the past through the present to the horizon of the future – Husserl’s (2012) ontological structure which enables consciousness. Although Frances Fukuyama (1993) picks up on the fatality of the last man, he was not really concerned to express this problem of identity in his work on the end of history. However, there is a sense in which the condition Virilio and Stiegler explain through their works on speed explains the philosophical and psychoanalytic impact of the end of history upon subjectivity. Perhaps the trans-fixed figure they paint in their explorations of destroyed subjectivity is Fukuyama’s last man who is endlessly fascinated, stimulated, and bored by the (im)possibility of the future in the decrepit sci-fi society. In Stiegler’s (2010) account where subjectivity is made through the retention of memory and subsequent protention of thought into the future, if the individual cannot understand himself in terms of the past, present, and future, because there is no horizon, it becomes impossible to think about the evolution of the present and nihilism becomes all the rage. Enter the tyranny of a moment, a kind of funereal instant, where everything and nothing happens now, because there is no coherent sign system to order thought. Without a symbolic system, what Lacan (2007) calls the symbolic order, to organise his sense of self through time, the lonely subject has only one alternative: regression back towards an earlier form of identification, the mirror stage, where he never changes. 

This is, of course, the therapeutic value, if one could call this pathological effect therapeutic, of the negative abyss today. While the maelstrom of signs destroys the individual’s sense of self, because we have no way to orient ourselves within this blizzard of information, the negative abyss offers some sense of hopeless hope, or dark utopianism. It offers the illusion of possibility. The flat screen opens out onto the strike through future (future), but also reflects the viewer’s own image back to him in order to provide some sense of stability in the post-modern maelstrom of abstract information and empty symbolisation. When the machine sleeps and the screens switches off the viewer confronts impenetrable darkness haunted by the ghostly image of the self. All the viewer sees is his own reflection – the self as technological spectre. Thus the flat screen, the negative abyss that promises entry to the future, is also a mirror that compensates for the generalised lack of symbolic structure through the way it reflects the viewer back to themselves. While the viewer, or perhaps user is a better noun because of its relation to addictive behaviour, cannot grow through the Lacanian symbolic order where change is possible, they can at least confirm their own existence through their image which looks back at them every time they open their iPad. As John O’Neill (1991) noted in his Plato’s Cave, tele-video ergo sum - I am on screen, therefore I am. How else can we explain the obsession with auto-photography today – ‘the selfie’ – but through this theory of regressive imaginary identification? According to this thesis, the user must continually reassert their existence before the maelstrom of signs by photographing themselves and posting their image online. In other words, we become techno-narcissus, and survive through basic self-identification. In the past people took pictures of each other, in order to remember social relations, but in the contemporary society where we are ‘alone together’, to refer to Sherry Turkle’s (2011) work, the individual must assert their own imaginary existence in order to save their sanity. 

While Virilio (2006a) critiques contemporary art for its abstraction, which effectively destroys the human, Stiegler (2011b) explains that the screen, and in particular cinema, creates narratives out of the post-modern storm of signs in order to situate the self in its state of disorientation. However, the problem with this process of situation is that it entails subjective adaptation to the technological world, rather than adoption, which refers to the process of internalisation and identification that enables the subject to develop through chains of trans-individuation. As such, Stiegler (2011b) shows how the screen, and the cinematic image, locates the subject in a post-human sphere, rather than enables trans-individual growth, and provides them with the minimal conditions for psychological survival. I would argue that the same is true of the contemporary narcissistic practice of self-photography where the lonely individual, or dis-individual, asserts their own existence through digital image capture and upload onto the global network. In this way the dis-individual captures their own image through the reflection of the screen in order to remember their existence. The selfie is thus a kind of desperate defence mechanism against the fall into fragmentary identity or psychosis - the fate of R. D. Laing’s (2010) schizophrenic who literally dissolves away into the dark nothingness of the abyss. Unfortunately, the problem with the imaginary stage of identification, and the selfie is an example of this, resides in its immobility, which is precisely the problem with the technological worlds imagined by Virilio and Stiegler. Although these worlds are endlessly mobile and the pace of technological change is relentless, both Virilio and Stiegler show that humanity has been left behind and transformed into a kind of excremental remainder. As a result, and in a desperate attempt to survive, this is why the dis-individual transforms himself into a kind of living statue unable to feel, or relate to the world through his body, which is always somewhere else. 

Following Stiegler’s (2011b) work, we can see that through the selfie, the image that is impervious to time and thus never changes, the user saves their identity through transformation into a kind of image-God – a post-modern tech-no-body. There is no lack in this imaginary space – the dis-individual can be complete, a total image – even though we know that those who have no lack, the Gods, are always miserable. We learn this from William Burroughs (2010), who wrote about the OGU (the One God Universe) where God is paradoxically crippled by his omnipotence which precludes movement and change, and Freud (2010), who theorised the horror of the prosthetic God before World War II. For Freud, what kills the prosthetic God is his obsessive commitment to technology. He literally rationalises and mechanises his humanity out of existence, leaving himself lost, a miserable shell of a person surrounded by so many machines and gadgets. However, in the wake of Freud’s warning about the horror of the prosthetic God, transformation into the image remains our best defence against the horror of psychological disorientation. From the perspective of the founder of psychoanalysis, the permanently present future is, thus, a symbol of the regression of humanity to its limit case – the ability to identify itself in its own reflection in the techno-abyss of the screen that stares back. But the costs of this sci-fi regression are great. In transforming himself into a self-identical image, the lonely cybernetic dis-individual becomes his own object, with the effect that everybody else also becomes an object – what Heinz Kohut (2009) calls a self-object, a thing for use. Caught under this instrumental logic, which is also coincidentally the sadistic logic of neoliberal capitalism, social relations collapse into asociality, and the prospects of violence, everyday sadism, and what Virilio (2008b) calls pure war increase. Alone together, the eroticism of the object and the screen, the negative abyss that promises escape, become ever more seductive, even though this is precisely what locks the user into his desperate, gloomy, solipsism. 
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